Abstract. WG and LEX are two stream ciphers submitted to eStreamthe ECRYPT stream cipher project. In this paper, we point out security flaws in the resynchronization of these two ciphers. The resynchronization of WG is vulnerable to a differential attack. For WG with 80-bit key and 80-bit IV, 48 bits of the secret key can be recovered with about 2 31.3 chosen IVs . For each chosen IV, only the first four keystream bits are needed in the attack. The resynchronization of LEX is vulnerable to a slide attack. If a key is used with about 2 60.8 random IVs, and 20,000 keystream bytes are generated from each IV, then the key of the strong version of LEX could be recovered easily with a slide attack. The resynchronization attack on WG and LEX shows that block cipher related attacks are powerful in analyzing non-linear resynchronization mechanisms.
Introduction
For the research on stream ciphers, resynchronization atacks have not been studied as thoroughly as the keystream generation algorithm itself. Ten years ago, Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle analyzed the weakness of linear resynchronization mechanism with known output Boolean function [5] . Later Golić and Morgari studied linear resynchronization mechanisms with unknown output function [7] . However almost all the stream ciphers proposed recently use non-linear resynchronization mechanisms, so the previous attacks on linear resynchronization mechanisms could no longer be applied. Recently Armknecht, Lano and Preneel applied algebraic attacks and linear cryptanalysis to the resynchronization mechanism and obtained lower bounds for the nonlinearity required from a secure resynchronization mechanism [1] . In this paper, we apply the differential attack and slide attack to stream ciphers with non-linear resynchronization. We show that the cryptanalysis techniques used to attack block ciphers are also useful in the analysis of non-linear resynchronization mechanisms.
WG [11] and LEX [4] are two stream ciphers submitted to eStream, the ECRYPT stream cipher project [6] . The keystream generation algorithms of WG and LEX are quite strong. The keystream generation of WG is based on the WG transformation which has excellent cryptographic properties [8] . The keystream generation of LEX is based on the Advanced Encryption Standard [10] . However, the resynchronization mechanism of WG and LEX are insecure. The resynchronization mechanism of WG is vulnerable to the differential attack [2] and that of LEX is vulnerable to a slide attack [3] . Breaking 
The stream cipher WG
WG is a hardware oriented stream cipher with key length up to 128 bits; it supports IV sizes from 32 bits to 128 bits. The main feature of the WG stream cipher is the use of the WG transformation to generate keystream from an LFSR. Fig. 1 . Keystream generation diagram of WG [11] The keystream generation diagram of WG is given in Fig. 1 . WG has a regularly clocked LFSR which is defined by the feedback polynomial
Keystream Generation
over GF (2 29 ), where γ = β 464730077 and β is the primitive root of g(x)
Then the non-linear WG transformation, GF (2 29 ) → GF (2), is applied to generate the keystream from the LFSR.
Resynchronization (Key/IV setup)
The key/IV setup of WG is given in Fig. 2 . After the key and IV have been loaded into the LFSR, it is clocked 22 steps. During each of these 22 steps, 29 bits from the middle of the WG transformation are XORed to the feedback of LFSR, as shown in Fig. 2 . Fig. 2 . Key/IV setup of WG [11] One step of the key/IV setup can be expressed as follows:
where W G (S(11)) denotes the 29 bits extracted from the WG transformation, as shown in Fig. 2 .
The WG cipher supports several key and IV sizes: the key size can be 80 bits, 96 bits, 112 bits and 128 bits and the IV sizes can be 32 bits, 64 bits, 80 bits, 96 bits, 112 bits, and 128 bits. Slightly different resynchronization mechanisms are used for the different IV sizes. The details are given in Sect. 3.
The stream cipher LEX
LEX is based on the block cipher AES. The keystream bits are generated by extracting 32 bits from each round of AES in the 128-bit Output Feedback (OFB) mode [9] . LEX is about 2.5 times faster than AES. Fig. 3 shows how the AES is initialized and chained. First a standard AES key-schedule for a secret 128-bit key K is performed. Then a given 128-bit IV is encrypted by a single AES invocation: S = AES K (IV ). The S and the subkeys are the output of the initialization process. [4] 3 The Differential Attacks on the Resynchronization of WG
The resynchronization of WG can be broken with a chosen IV attack based on differential cryptanalysis. (We remind the readers that the details of the differential attack given in this paper are slightly different from the standard differential attack on a block cipher, such as the generation of the differential pairs and the filtering of the wrong pairs.) WG with a 32-bit IV size is not vulnerable to the attack given in this section (since no special differential can be introduced into this short IV). In Sec. 3.1 the attack is applied to break an WG with an 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV. The attacks on WG with IV sizes larger than 80 bits are given in Sect. 3.2. The attack on a WG with a 64-bit IV size is given in Sec. 3.3.
An attack on WG with an 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV
We investigate the security of the key/IV setup of WG with an 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV. For this version of WG, denote the key as All the remaining bits of the LFSR are set to zero. Then the LFSR is clocked 22 steps with the middle value from the WG transformation being used in the feedback. The chosen IV attack on WG goes as follows. For each secret key K, we choose two IVs, IV and IV , so that IV and IV are identical in 8 bytes, but differ in two bytes: IV 17,...,24 = IV 17,...,24 and IV 49,...,56 = IV 49,...,56 . The differences satisfy IV 17,...,24 ⊕ IV 17,...,24 = IV 49,...,56 ⊕ IV 49,...,56 .
Denote the value of S(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ 11) at the end of the j-th step by S j (i), and denote loading the key/IV as the 0th step. After loading the key and the chosen IV into LFSR, we know that the differences in S(2) and S(5) are the same, i.e., S 
We now examine the differential propagation during the 22 steps in the key/IV setup. The complete differential propagation is shown in Table 1 , where the differences at the i-th step indicate the differences at the end of the i-th step. The difference 2 = (γ×S
From Table 1 , we notice that at the end of the 22th step, the difference at S 22 (10) is 2 ⊕ 3 . From the above description of 2 and 3 , we know that
This shows that the value of 2 ⊕ 3 is determined by k 17,...,24 , k 49,...,64 , IV 9,...,24 , IV 49,...,56 , IV 9,...,24 , IV 49,...,56 .
From the keystream generation of WG, we know that the first keystream bit is generated from S 22 (10) (after the key/IV setup, the LFSR is clocked, and S 23 (11) is used to generate the first keystream bit). If 2 ⊕ 3 = 0, then the first keystream bits for IV and IV should be the same. This property is applied in the attack to determine whether the value of 2 ⊕ 3 is 0.
Assume that the value of 2 ⊕ 3 is randomly distributed, then 2 ⊕ 3 = 0 with probability 2 −29 . We thus need to generate about 2 29 pairs ( 2 , 3 ) in order to obtain a pair satisfying 2 ⊕ 3 = 0. Note that the key is fixed and that 
The attacks on WG with key and IV sizes larger than 80 bits
The WG ciphers with the key and IV sizes larger than 80 bits are all vulnerable to the chosen IV attacks. The attacks are very similar to the above attack. We omit the details of the attacks here. The results are given below:
1. For WG with 96-bit key and 96-bit IV, 48 bits of the key can be recovered with complexity about the same as the above attack. 2. For WG with IV sizes larger than 96 bits, 72 bits of the key can be recovered with complexity about 1.5 times that of the above attack.
The attacks on WG with 64-bit IV size
We use WG with an 80-bit key and a 64-bit IV as an example to illustrate the attack. For WG cipher with an 80-bit key and a 64-bit IV, the key and IV are loaded into the LFSR as follows: In the attack, we introduce differences at S(2) and S(5), but we can only generate about 2 23 pairs of ( 2 , 3 ) since we can only modify IV 9,...,16 and IV 33,...,40 . Thus we can obtain a pair ( 2 , 3 ) satisfying 2 ⊕ 3 = 0 or 1 ⊕ 2 ⊕ 3 = 0 with probability 2 −5 . Once we know 2 ⊕ 3 = 0 or 1 ⊕ 2 ⊕ 3 = 0, we can recover 29 bits of information on k 17,...,32 and k 65,...,80 . It shows that 29 bits of information of the secret key can be recovered with probability 2 −5 . This attack requires about 2 25.1 chosen IVs. The attack on WG with 96-bit key and 64-bit IV is similar to the above attack. We introduce differences at S(2) and S(5) or at S(3) and S (6) . In the attack 29 bits of information on k 17,...,32 and k 65,...,80 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , and another 29 bits of information on k 33,...,48 and k 81,...,96 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 . The attack on WG with 112-bit key and 64-bit IV is also similar. The result is that 29 bits of information on k 17,...,32 and k 65,...,80 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , 29 bits of information on k 33,...,48 and k 81,...,96 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , and 29 bits of information on k 49,...,64 and k 97,...,112 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 . The attack on WG with 128-bit key and 64-bit IV is also similar. The result is that 29 bits of information on k 17,...,32 and k 65,...,80 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , 29 bits of information on k 33,...,48 and k 81,...,96 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , 29 bits of information on k 49,...,64 and k 97,...,112 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 , and 29 bits of information on k 64,...,80 and k 113,...,128 can be recovered with probability 2 −5 .
A Slide Attack on the Resynchronization of LEX
The security of LEX depends heavily on the fact that only a small amount of information is released for each round (including the input and output) of AES. The slide attack intends to retrieve all the information of one AES round input (or output) in LEX.
, where E i (m) means that m is encrypted i times, S 0 = IV ; denote the 320 bits extracted from the i-th encryption with k i for i ≥ 2. For two IVs, IV and IV , if k 2 = k j (j > 2), then we know that S 1 = S j−1 . Immediately, we know that S j−2 = S 0 = IV . Note that k j−1 is extracted from E K (S j−2 ), so k j−1 is extracted from E K (IV ); this means that we know the input to AES, and we know 32 bits from the output of the first round. In the following, we show that it is easy to recover the secret key from this 32 bits of information of the first round output.
Denote the 16-byte output of the r-th round of AES with m 
Each equation leaks one byte of information on the secret key. In the above four equations, 12 bytes of the subkey are involved. To recover all these 12 bytes, we need three inputs to AES and the related 32-bit first round outputs so that we can obtain 12 equations. These 12 equations can be solved with about α × 2 32 operations, where α is a small constant. With 96 bits of the key have been recovered, the rest of the 32 bits of AES can be recovered by exhaustive search.
We 
× 2
−128 ≈ 3. The number of IVs could be reduced if more keystream bits are generated from each IV. In [4] , it is suggested to change the key every 500 AES encryptions for a strong variant of LEX. Suppose that each IV is applied to generate 500 320-bit outputs, then with 2 60.8 IVs, we could find three collisions k
(2 < x < 500) and recover the key of LEX. For the original version of LEX, the AES key is not changed during the keystream generation. Suppose that each IV is used to generate 2 50 keystream bytes, then the key could be recovered with about 2
43 random IVs (here we need to consider that the state update function of LEX is reversible; otherwise, the amount of IV required in the attack could be greatly reduced).
For a secure stream cipher with a 128-bit key and a 128-bit IV, each key would never be recovered faster than exhaustive key search no matter how many IVs are used together with that key. But for LEX each key could be recovered faster than exhaustive search if that key is used together with about 2 61 random IVs. We thus conclude that LEX is theoretically insecure.
For a stream cipher with 128-bit key and 128-bit IV, if the attacker can choose the IV, then one of 2 64 keys could be recovered with about 2 64 pre-computations (based on the birthday paradox). The complexity of such an attack is close to our attack on LEX. However, there are two major differences between these two attacks. One difference is that the attack based on birthday paradox is a chosen IV attack while our attack is a random IV attack. Another difference is that the attack based on birthday paradox results in the recovery of one of n keys, while our attack recovers one particular key. Recovering one of n keys and recovering one particular key are two different types of attacks being used in different scenarios, so it is not meaningful to simply compare their complexities.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the resynchronization mechanisms of WG and LEX are vulnerable to a differential attack and a slide attack, respectively. It shows that the block cipher cryptanalysis techniques are powerful in analyzing the non-linear resynchronization mechanism of a stream cipher.
The designers of WG recommended to use 44 steps in the initialization to resist a differential attack [12] . It is a small modification to the design to achieve secure key/IV setup. However, it is inefficient. We recommend to change the primitive polynomial tap positions so that the tap distances are coprime, and to generate the first keystream bit from S(1) instead of S(10). Then we expect that WG with 22-step key/IV setup will be able to resist a differential attack.
